

Abdirahman Tigey

Puntland's Fiscal Autonomy

Economic sovereignty, state capacity, and strategic balance.

Puntland's economic future will not be determined only by how much it grows. It will be determined by how that growth is structured, who controls the instruments that sustain it, and whether its fiscal system strengthens or weakens long-term autonomy.

As Puntland thinks more seriously about currency, taxation, public expenditure, and long-term economic governance, the central question is how it can combine Keynesian intervention and laissez-faire economics into a strategic macroeconomic framework that preserves autonomy, reinforces stability, prevents dependency, and safeguards long-term decision-making power. That is the real issue.

Too often, macroeconomic debates are framed too simply. One side emphasizes the developmental role of the state through public spending, infrastructure, demand support, and active intervention to correct structural weakness. The other emphasizes the productive force of markets: entrepreneurship, competition, lower barriers to enterprise, and the efficiency that comes from decentralized economic activity. Both perspectives capture something important. But for Puntland, neither is sufficient in pure form. The real question is not which doctrine appears more persuasive in theory. It is which combination of fiscal tools best serves Puntland's strategic condition.

Fiscal policy as national strategy

That distinction matters because, in the logic of the Strategic Middle Path and the Puntland Defense Codex, fiscal policy cannot be treated as a narrow technocratic matter. It is part of a wider architecture of survival. Economic weakness can become political weakness. Fiscal dependency can become external leverage. Macroeconomic instability can erode public trust, weaken internal cohesion, and narrow room for maneuver in moments of pressure. Fiscal policy must therefore be understood strategically.

At the center of this approach is a simple principle: economic policy should be judged by whether it strengthens Puntland's autonomy, protects stability, and reduces vulnerability to domination. That standard matters more than ideology. A policy that produces growth while deepening dependency is not a success. A policy that expands state activity while weakening fiscal discipline is not a success either. What matters is whether Puntland emerges with greater control over its economic direction.

The strategic role of Keynesian intervention

From that perspective, Keynesian intervention has an important role. In a developing environment marked by weak infrastructure, high unemployment, limited industrial depth, and shallow capital markets, the state cannot remain passive. Public investment in roads, ports, energy, water systems, education, and administrative capacity does more than stimulate short-term demand. It builds the material foundations of productive growth, lowers structural bottlenecks, extends the reach of governance, and reduces the vulnerabilities that arise when underdevelopment leaves society exposed to fragmentation, exclusion, and outside pressure.

In Puntland's case, this matters because underdevelopment is not only an economic problem. It is a strategic one. A territory with weak infrastructure, limited employment creation, and fragile public systems is more exposed to internal instability and external leverage. Targeted state spending, if disciplined and well directed, can therefore serve the same broader purpose as the Strategic Middle Path itself: preserving autonomy by strengthening the conditions that make meaningful self-government possible.

But that is only part of the answer. A purely interventionist model would create its own dangers. If public spending expands without discipline, becomes detached from productive capacity, or turns into a vehicle for patronage rather than development, it can generate the fragility it was meant to overcome. Debt burdens can rise, inflationary pressures can intensify, and fiscal credibility can erode. In that condition, the state begins to undermine its own autonomy through new forms of dependence and administrative disorder.

Market freedom and its limits

That is why laissez-faire principles also matter. Markets are not simply ideological preferences. They are engines of innovation, competition, investment, and decentralized productive energy. A healthy private sector broadens the tax base, creates employment, attracts capital, and reduces the burden on the state to act as the sole driver of growth. Over time, no economy becomes resilient if it depends entirely on public expenditure, customs rents, or narrow revenue streams. Long-term strength requires a productive society in which enterprise, trade, and investment generate independent momentum.

For Puntland, this gives market freedom strategic value. A stronger private sector does not only create wealth. It creates resilience, diversifies sources of growth, reduces the risks of fiscal overcentralization, and ensures that the economy is not dependent on a single political mechanism for survival. But here too, there are limits. In an underdeveloped environment, markets alone will not reliably build the public goods on which long-term growth depends. They will not always finance major infrastructure, invest where returns are delayed or widely shared, or protect strategically important but commercially uncertain sectors. Without capable institutions, markets can deepen inequality, concentrate opportunity narrowly, and leave essential sectors underdeveloped.

A disciplined synthesis

That is why Puntland's path cannot be purely Keynesian or purely laissez-faire. It must be strategic. The correct approach is not to choose one doctrine and reject the other. It is to combine both in a disciplined way, according to Puntland's actual conditions and long-term objectives. The state must be strong where autonomy requires strength and restrained where society prospers best through private initiative. Public intervention must build the foundations of productive capacity. Market freedom must deepen growth once those foundations are secure. That is the fiscal meaning of autonomy.

It begins with state capacity. Puntland needs revenue systems that function, budgets that are credible, infrastructure that lowers the cost of economic activity, and public institutions capable of directing resources toward long-term priorities rather than short-term political consumption. This is not state expansion for its own sake. It is state-building in the service of autonomy.

But state capacity alone is not enough. Over time, Puntland must also widen the space for markets to operate more effectively. That means reducing unnecessary barriers to enterprise, improving regulatory predictability, widening access to finance, and creating conditions in which businesses can invest, hire, and grow without being suffocated by administrative weakness or arbitrary intervention. The long-run goal is not a permanently state-dominated economy. It is a resilient one in which the state provides strategic direction and institutional foundations while the private sector generates broader prosperity.

Aid and investment under fiscal strategy

This is also where external economic engagement must be disciplined. International aid cannot sit outside Puntland's fiscal policy as an independent sphere governed by donor priorities, parallel mechanisms, or externally defined timelines. If aid is to contribute to development, it must be subordinate to Puntland's own fiscal strategy, integrated into its budgetary logic, and aligned with long-term priorities. Otherwise, it risks weakening institutional discipline, fragmenting state authority, and creating forms of dependency that undermine autonomy rather than strengthen it.

The same principle applies to international investment. External capital can be useful, and in many sectors necessary, but it cannot be treated as a neutral good detached from strategy. Investment must be subordinate to Puntland's fiscal policy and aligned with the Defense Codex's doctrine of external partnership as derived from the Strategic Middle Path. That means partnerships must strengthen domestic capacity rather than bypass it, reinforce fiscal sovereignty rather than hollow it out, and remain consistent with Puntland's autonomy, stability, and non-domination. External engagement should support Puntland's strategic direction, not define it.

Sequencing development

This is where sequencing becomes critical. In the near term, Puntland will likely require a stronger state role in infrastructure, public administration, revenue collection, and the provision of foundational goods that markets alone are unlikely to supply adequately. That is the phase in which Keynesian tools are most useful, not as abstract stimulus, but as instruments of structural development. Over time, as institutional credibility improves and the private sector deepens, the balance should begin to shift. The state should move gradually from direct provision toward facilitation, while markets take on a greater role in generating investment, efficiency, and diversification. The purpose is not to retreat from strategy, but to recognize that long-term prosperity requires more than government spending. It requires an economic system capable of sustaining itself through productive social energy.

This sequencing is fully consistent with the deeper logic of the Strategic Middle Path. Puntland should avoid premature commitments, whether political or economic. It should not lock itself too early into rigid models that reduce flexibility before institutional conditions are favorable. Instead, it should build capacity, preserve control, and expand room for maneuver as conditions evolve.

The instruments of economic autonomy

That is why the core principles remain the same. Autonomy means retaining control over revenue, expenditure priorities, strategic assets, and the broader direction of economic policy. Stability means building trust in institutions, reducing volatility, strengthening the foundations of order, and creating predictable conditions for growth and investment. Non-domination means resisting forms of dependency that can later be converted into political leverage. Debt traps, external capture of key infrastructure, overreliance on single outside partners, and weak fiscal credibility all risk hollowing out real autonomy even if formal self-government remains intact.

This is why fiscal policy must be treated as part of national strategy. A budget is not only a set of numbers. It is a statement of priorities. A tax system is not only a revenue tool. It is an instrument of state reach and economic design. A future currency is not only a monetary symbol. It is a test of institutional credibility, fiscal discipline, and political seriousness. Aid is not simply assistance, and investment is not simply capital. Both can either strengthen Puntland's strategic position or weaken it, depending on whether they are subordinated to Puntland's own doctrine and institutions.

In that sense, Puntland's fiscal future should be neither doctrinaire nor improvised. It should be disciplined, sequenced, and strategically coherent. It should draw from Keynesian intervention where public investment is needed to build the material foundations of sovereignty, and from laissez-faire economics where market dynamism is needed to generate innovation, diversification, and long-term resilience. Both domestic fiscal design and external economic engagement must serve a larger purpose: preserving Puntland's freedom of action in an environment where economic weakness can easily become political dependency.

The meaning of fiscal autonomy

That is the real challenge. The question is not whether Puntland should be more interventionist or more market-oriented in the abstract. The question is whether its fiscal system is building the capacity to govern itself, the resilience to withstand shocks, and the credibility to retain control over its own future.

That is what fiscal autonomy means. It is not compromise for its own sake. It is not ideological indecision. It is a deliberate strategy: use the state to build what markets cannot yet sustain, use markets to expand what the state cannot efficiently generate on its own, and ensure that external aid, external investment, and domestic fiscal policy all serve the higher goals of autonomy, stability, and non-domination.

In the end, Puntland's strength will not come from adopting a textbook model. It will come from building a macroeconomic order serious enough to support self-government, disciplined enough to preserve credibility, and flexible enough to keep future choices open. The path forward, here as elsewhere, is not ideological. It is disciplined. And it begins with a simple commitment: to build an economic order strong enough to preserve, above all else, Puntland's freedom to choose.

From fiscal autonomy to external doctrine

The fiscal argument establishes why aid, investment, and strategic infrastructure cannot be governed separately from national purpose. The foreign policy doctrine extends that requirement to the full network of external relationships. Fiscal autonomy supplies bargaining capacity; disciplined external engagement protects it from being traded away through dependence.